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1 Introduction
Many real-life problems involve matching agents to institutions that are composed of divisions
such as firms, hospitals, or schools. These divisions are endowed with their own choice
rules. That is, each division has a well-defined choice rule that selects from any given set
of alternatives and a capacity. In some applications, choice rules are induced1 from a strict
ranking of alternatives. In many others, the choices are more complicated and cannot be
generated so easily. To make it precise, consider a choice rule that selects applicants on
the basis of their merit scores but also requires that the division select a minimum number
of disabled applicants whenever possible. Such a choice rule is obviously not a responsive
choice rule.
Moreover, in many real-world institutions, there are cross-division constraints, in the
sense that the number of available positions in a division might depend on the number
of applicants hired by other divisions. For example, consider a business school whose
departments—economics, finance, marketing, etc.— are in the job market to hire new fac-
ulty. Suppose that the finance group hires first, followed by the economics department, which
is then followed by the marketing department. The number of available positions for the
marketing group might be increased if either the finance or the economics department hire
fewer new faculty than what they initially planned, provided that the total budget of the
business school is not exceeded.
In this paper, we study a many-to-one matching with contracts that incorporates a theory
of choice of institutions that are composed of divisions. We formulate a new and practical
family of choice rules, Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules (GLCR), for institutions.
Each institution has a total capacity, i.e., a number of available positions, and a pre-specified
linear order at which it fills its divisions. Each division is endowed with a choice rule, i.e.,
a sub-choice rule. Each sub-choice rule has two inputs: the set of available options and its
(dynamic) capacity. For each division, both of the inputs depend on the choices made by
the divisions that precede it. The set of available options can be thought of as the set of
remaining options from the choices of divisions that precede it. The dynamic capacity of
each division is a function of the number of unfilled seats of the divisions that precede it
given by an exogenously specified capacity transfer function. The overall choice rule of an
institution is then defined as the union its divisions’ sub-choice rules. The collection of these
sub-choice rules and the capacity transfer scheme identify an overall choice rule.
We impose three conditions on sub-choice rules: Substitutability, size monotonicity and
1These are choice rules for which there is a rational strict preference relation that always selects the
q − best elements whenever available. Such choice rules are referred to as “q-responsive.”
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quota monotonicity. A choice rule is substitutable if no two alternatives x and y are com-
plementary, in the sense that gaining access to x makes y desirable. A choice rule is size
monotonic if it chooses weakly more alternatives whenever the set of available alternatives
expands. A choice rule satisfies quota monotonicity if the following conditions hold: (1) If
there is an increase in capacity, then the choice rule selects every alternative it chose be-
forehand, given any set of alternatives, and (2) If the capacity of a division increases by κ,
then the difference between the number of alternatives chosen under increased capacity and
the initial capacity cannot exceed κ. There are many non-responsive choice rules that are
crucial for real-world applications and satisfy these three conditions2. One such family of
choice rules in GLCR is introduced in our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2019b), in
the context of matching problems in India with complex reservation constraints.
We impose a mild condition, monotonicity, on capacity transfer functions, à la Westkamp
(2013). The monotonicity condition requires that (1) whenever weakly more seats are left
unfilled in every division preceding the jth division, weakly more slots should be available
for the jth division, and (2) an institution cannot decrease its total capacity in response
to increased demand in some divisions. Our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2019b),
introduces several such monotonic capacity transfer functions in the context of comprehensive
affirmative action constraints in college admissions and public sector job hiring in India.
We show how markets with generalized lexicographic choice rules can be cleared by the
cumulative offer mechanism (COM). To illustrate this, we borrowed the novel observability
theory of Hatfield et al. (2019). We prove that when sub-choice rules satisfy substitutability,
size monotonicity, and quota monotonicity, and when the capacity transfer functions are
monotonic, then the overall choice rules of institutions satisfies: the irrelevance of rejected
contracts condition (Proposition 1), the observable substitutability (Proposition 2), the ob-
servable size monotonicity (Proposition 3), and the non-manipulation via contractual terms
(Proposition 4).
Our first main result, Theorem 1, follows by the characterization result of Hatfield et
al. (2019). The authors show that when choice rules of institutions are observably substi-
tutable, observably size monotonic and non-manipulable via contractual terms, the COM is
the unique mechanism which is stable and strategy-proof (for agents). Therefore, in market-
places in which institutions’ choice rules can be modeled, as in the GLCR family, the COM
is the uniquely stable and strategy-proof mechanism.
We define a choice-based notion of improvement. We say that a choice rule of a division
is an improvement over another choice rule for an individual if (1) whenever the latter choice
2Note that the responsiveness of a choice rule implies substitutability, size monotonicity, and quota
monotonicity.
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rule selects an individual’s contract, the former selects a contract (not necessarily the same
contract) from her as well, and (2) when no contract of the individual is selected by either
of the choice rules, then both choice rules select the same set. We extend this improvement
notion to institutions’ choice rules by requiring that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied for
every division. Our second main result states that the COM respects improvements. This
result has important implications for real-world applications.
Finally, we note that the generality of our framework enables novel market design ap-
plications. The GLCR family via the COM offers a satisfactory solution to many practical
real-world assignment problems. We present one such application in our companion paper
Aygün and Turhan (2019b) in the context of comprehensive affirmative action in India for
admission to publicly funded edicational institutions and government sponsored jobs. How-
ever, we believe that the theory we develop in this paper might help to design centralized
marketplaces beyond the Indian case.
Practical Applications
1. College Admission and Government Job Recruitment in India India has been
using one of the most comprehensive affirmative action policies in the world for decades. This
policy is embedded in its constitution. There are two types of reservations in India: vertical
(also called social) and horizontal (also called special) reservations3. Vertical reservations
have been provided as a level playing field for historically disadvantaged castes and tribes. At
each institution, certain fractions of available seats are reserved for people from Scheduled
Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC). The remaining
members of society are collectively categorized under the General Category (GC)4. Within
each vertical category, horizontal reservations are implemented for specific groups, such as
disabled people, women, people from hill areas, etc. For each horizontal reservation category, a
certain minimum number of such individuals must be admitted within each vertical category.
Each vertical category in an institution can be modeled as a division in our framework.
Two recents papers, Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a&b), study affirmative action in India
with comprehensive affirmative action. The authors formulate the complex Indian affirmative
action constraints and introduce “vertical” and “horizontal” reservations terminology. Sönmez
and Yenmez (2019a) formulate shortcomings of the choice procedure given in the Supreme
Court judgement in Anil Kumar Gupta vs. State of U. P. (1995), and document that these
3Aygün and Turhan (2019a) consider caste-based reservations only and assume away special reservations
for simplicity. See also Aygün and Turhan (2017).
4In 2019, the Union Government of India approved 10 percent reservation in government jobs and publicly
funded educational institutions for the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) in the GC. The EWS is a
subcategory of people belonging to the GC having an annual family income less than a certain amount.
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shortcomings are the main cause of numerous lawsuits in India. The authors provide an
alternative choice rule to resolve these shortcomings.
Aygün and Turhan (2019b) formulates a sub-choice function for divisions that respects
merit scores while also satisfying horizontal reservations. We show that these non-responsive
sub-choice rules are substitutable, size monotonic, and quota monotonic. We design different
monotonic capacity transfer functions depending on the application in India. Therefore,
following the theory developed in this paper, we show that the COM can satisfactorily clear
several different two-sided many-to-one matching markets in India with comprehensive affir-
mative action constraints. Our approach in Aygün and Turhan (2019b) is sharply different
than Sönmez and Yenmez ’s (2019a&b) approach. In particular, we consider
• applicants’ preferences not only over institution but also over vertical category they
are admitted under5, and
• reverting unfilled OBC seats to GC, which is also called OBC de-reservation.
Therefore, the theory we developed in this paper allows us to formulate in the Indian affir-
mative action problem in its full generality.
2. Regional Quotas in Residency Matching in Japan This real-world market design
problem is first introduced by Kamada and Kojima (2015) and later studied by Kamada and
Kojima (2017 and 2018), Kojima et al. (2018), and Goto et al. (2017).
In 2008, the Japanese government introduced a regional cap that restricts the total
number of medical resident matches within each of the 47 prefectures, in order to regulate
the geographical distributions of doctors. Each prefecture consists of multiple hospitals.
Prefectures can be modeled as institutions, and hospitals in a prefecture can be modeled as
divisions of the institution. In Japan, hospitals’ (divisions’) sub-choice rules are responsive.
Hence, the axioms we imposed on sub-choice rules are trivially satisfied. Depending on the
specific government goals, monotonic capacity transfer schemes among hospitals in the same
prefecture can be formulated so that the COM performs satisfactorily.
Related Literature
The matching problem with generalized lexicographic choice rules is a special case of the
matching with contracts model of Fleiner (2003) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). Fleiner
5It is optional for SC, ST and OBC applicants to report the vertical category they belong. Many
candidates from these groups do not reveal their caste and tribe membership and utilize its benefits. Aygün
and Turhan (2019b) provide further evidence on why candidates have preferences also over the ctegory
through which they are admitted.
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(2003)6 introduced a matching model with contracts in which institutions are allowed to select
multiple contracts with a given agent. Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) assume a substitutes
condition, which was later weakened by Hatfield and Kojima (2010), who maintained the
stability and strategy-proofness of the COM.
Hatfield et al. (2019) characterize when stable and strategy-proof matching is possi-
ble in many-to-one matching setting with contracts. The authors introduce three novel
conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulability
via contractual terms—and show that when these conditions are satisfied, the COM is the
unique mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof (for agents). Moreover, they show that
their three conditions are necessary in the following sense: When the choice rule of some
institution fails any of their three conditions, they can construct unit-demand choice rules
for the other institutions, such that no stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists. We
utilize their observability theory in the following sense: Each choice rule in the GLCR class
satisfies observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulation via
contractual terms conditions of Hatfield et al. (2019), as well as the irrelevance of rejected
contracts in Aygün and Sönmez (2013). Hence, following their characterization result, the
COM is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism in our environment.
The closest paper to ours is Hatfield et al. (2017). The authors show how to model insti-
tutions’ choices with cross-division constraints using the framework of matching with con-
tracts. Cross-division constraints introduce new complexities that render prior approaches
to proving stability and strategy-proofness inapplicable, including the approaches found in
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Hatfield and Kojima (2010), Kominers and Sönmez (2016),
and Hatfield and Kominers (2019). Building upon the observable substitutability theory of
Hatfield et al. (2019), the authors are able to show that stable and strategy-proof matching
is possible in the presence of cross-division constraints. They introduce a model of institu-
tional choice in which each institution has a set of divisions, as in our setting, and flexible
allotment capacities that vary as a function of the set of contracts available. Each institution
is modeled as having an allotment function that determines how many positions are allo-
cated to each division, given the set of available contracts. Our capacity transfer functions
are different than their allotment functions with respect to their very definitions and the
assumptions imposed.
Aygün and Turhan (2019a) study a model of dynamic reserves that is similar to the lexico-
graphic choice rules considered in this paper. However, the sub-choice rules are q-responsive
in their setting, whereas in the GLCR family the sub-choices might not be q-responsive.
6Fleiner’s results cover Hatfield and Milgrom’s (2005) result regarding stability. However, Fleiner (2003)
does not analyze incentives.
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Hence, the model of Aygün and Turhan (2019a) cannot accommodate the matching prob-
lems in India with both vertical and horizontal reservations, even though it can accommodate
the matching problems with vertical reservations only.
Our paper is related to Afacan (2017). The author is the first to define a choice-based
improvement notion. We also define a choice-based improvement notion in the absence
of priorities. We adapt his notion for overall choice rules to our sub-choice rules. The
difference between his notion and ours is critical, because he assumes that overall choice
rules satisfy unilateral substitutability, size monotonicity, and the irrelevance of rejected
contracts conditions. Both the unilateral substitutability and size monotonicity of overall
choice rules might be violated in our setting. His analysis—to show that the COM respects
improvements—relies on the existence of the agent-optimal stable matching while ours—our
proof for Theorem 2—does not.
Our paper is also related to the research agenda on matching with constraints studied in
a series of papers: Kamada and Kojima (2015, 2017 and 2018), Kojima et al. (2018), and
Goto et al. (2017). In these papers, constraints are imposed on subsets of institutions as
a joint restriction, as opposed to being imposed at each institution. A leading example in
these papers is the medical matching problem in Japan, in which the government imposes
regional caps, that serve as upper bounds on the number of doctors that can be placed in
each region of the country.
Our paper also contributes to the matching-theoretical school choice literature initiated
by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), in which the authors introduced a simple affirmative
action policy with type-specific quotas. Kojima (2012) investigates the consequences of af-
firmative action policy with type-specific quotas on students’ welfare. The author provides
examples in which all minority students are made worse off under this type of affirmative
action. To circumvent inefficiencies caused by majority quotas, Hafalır et al. (2013) offer
minority reserves. Echenique and Yenmez (2015) characterize choice rules for schools that
regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body.
Lexicographic choice rules are also studied in Alva (2016), Kominers and Sönmez (2016),
Chambers and Yenmez (2018), and Doğan et al. (2018) among others. Alva (2016) formu-
lates institutional choice functions that are lexicographic. The author analyzes the rela-
tionship between the properties imposed on divisions’ choice rules and that of institutions’
overall choice rule. Chambers and Yenmez (2018) consider lexicographic choice rules from
an axiomatic perspective. They show that lexicographic choice rules satisfy acceptance and
path independence, and that there are path independent choice rules that are not lexico-
graphic. Doğan et al. (2018) provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules and
a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanism that operate based on a lexicographic
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choice structure. Our focus on cross-division constraints while designing the GLCR family
and analyzing choice-based improvement notion in our setting differentiate our work from
these papers.
2 Matching with Contracts Setting
There is a finite set of agents I = {i1, ..., in} and a finite set of institutions S = {s1, ..., sm}.
There is a finite set of contracts X . Each contract x ∈ X is associated with an agent i(x)
and an institution s(x). There may be many contracts for each agent-institution pair. We
call a set of contracts X ⊆ X an outcome, with i(X) ≡ ∪
x∈X
{i(x)} and s(X) ≡ ∪
x∈X
{s(x)}.
For any i ∈ I ∪ S, we let Xi ≡ {x ∈ X | i ∈ {i(x), s(x)}}. An outcome X ⊆ X is feasible if
| Xi |≤ 1 for all i ∈ I.
Each agent i ∈ I has unit demand over contracts in Xi and an outside option ∅i. The
strict preference of agent i over Xi ∪ {∅i} is denoted by Pi. A contract x ∈ Xi is acceptable
for i (with respect to Pi) if xPi∅i. Agent preferences over contracts are extended preferences
over outcomes in the natural way.
Each institution s ∈ S has multi-unit demand and is endowed with a choice rule Cs
that describes how s would choose from any offered set of contracts. We let qs denote the
physical capacity of institution s. We assume throughout that for all X ⊆ X and for all
s ∈ S, the choice rule Cs (1) only selects contracts to which s is a party, i.e., Cs(X) ⊆ Xs,
and (2) selects at most one contract with any given agent and selects at most qs contracts,
i.e., Cs(X) is feasible.
For any X ⊆ X and s ∈ S, we denote by Rs(X) ≡ X \ Cs(X) the set of contracts that
s rejects from X.
Stability
A feasible outcome Y ⊆ X is stable if it is
1. Individually rational: Cs(Y ) = Ys for all s ∈ S, and YiRi∅i for all i ∈ I.
2. Unblocked: There does not exist a nonempty Z ⊆ (X \ Y ), such that Zs ⊆ Cs(Y ∪ Z)
for all s ∈ s(Z) and ZPiY for all i ∈ i(Z).
Stability requires that neither agents nor institutions wish to unilaterally walk away from
their assignments, and that agents and institutions cannot benefit by recontracting outside
of the match.
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Mechanisms
A mechanism M(·;C) maps preference profiles P = (Pi)i∈I to outcomes, given a profile of
institutional choice rules C = (Cs)s∈S . Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the choice
rules of the institutions are fixed and writeM(P ) in place ofM(P ;C).
A mechanismM is stable ifM(P ) is a stable outcome for every preference profile P . A
mechanism M is strategy-proof if for every preference profile P and for each agent i ∈ I,
there is no P˜i, such thatM(P˜i, P−i)PiM(P ).
Cumulative offer mechanisms constitute a particularly important class of mechanisms.
In a cumulative offer mechanism, C`, agents propose contracts according to a strict ordering
` of the elements of X . In every step, some agent who does not currently have a contract
held by any institution proposes his most preferred contract that has not yet been proposed.
Then, each institution chooses its most preferred set of contracts according to its choice
rule and holds this set until the next step. When multiple agents are able to propose in the
same step, the agent who actually proposes is determined by the ordering `. The mechanism
terminates when no agent is able to propose; at that point, each institution is assigned the set
of contracts it is holding. (We describe cumulative offer mechanisms formally in Appendix
B.)
3 Institutions’ Choice Rules for Stable and Strategy-Proof
Matching
In their novel analysis, Hatfield et al. (2019) characterized the conditions for institutional
choice rules to guarantee the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms. They also
showed that when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible, the outcome of any such
mechanism coincides with that of a cumulative offer mechanism. Moreover, the outcomes of
all cumulative offer mechanisms coincide.
In their seminal work, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) showed that the substitutes and
size monotonicity of institutions’ choice rules are sufficient7 for stable and strategy-proof
matching in many-to-one matching settings with contracts. A choice rule is substitutable if
no two contracts x and y are “complementary” in the sense that gaining access to x makes
y desirable. Formally, a choice rule Cs satisfies substitutability if for all x, y ∈ X and
X ⊆ X , y /∈ Cs(X ∪ {y}) implies y /∈ Cs(X ∪ {x, y}). Substitutability is the monotonicity
7The analysis of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) implicitly assumes the irrelevance of rejected contracts
(IRC) condition. Please see Aygün and Sönmez (2013) for details. Alkan (2002) refers to the same condition
as consistency.
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of the rejection function: Cs is substitutable if and only if we have Rs(X) ⊆ Rs(Y ) for all
sets of contracts X and Y such that X ⊆ Y .
The choice rule of institution s ∈ S is size monotonic8 if s chooses weakly more contracts
whenever the set of available contracts expands. That is, Cs is size monotonic if for all con-
tracts x ∈ X and sets of contracts X ⊆ X , we have | Cs(X) |≤| Cs(X ∪{x} |. Substitutable
and size monotonic choice rules satisfy the IRC condition. A choice rule Cs satisfies the IRC
if for all X ⊂ X and x ∈ X \X, x /∈ Cs(X ∪ {x}) implies Cs(X) = Cs(X ∪ {x}).
Hatfield et al. (2019) showed that for a cumulative offer mechanism to be stable and
strategy-proof, substitutability and size monotonicity need only hold during the running of
the mechanism itself. However, in that case, we also need to rule out intra-institutional
manipulation. Following their terminology, we will give definitions for three properties that,
if satisfied, guarantee the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism. We first
introduce necessary concepts. An offer process for a given institution s ∈ S, with choice
rule Cs, is a finite sequence of distinct contracts (x1, x2, ..., xM), such that for all m =
1, ...,M , xm ∈ Xs. We say that an offer process (x1, x2, ..., xM) for s is observable if, for all
m = 1, ...,M , i(xm) /∈ i(Cs({x1, ..., xm−1})), i.e, an observable offer process for institution s
is a sequence of contract offers proposed by agents, such that an agent can propose xm only
if that agent is rejected by s when this institution has access to {x1, x2, ..., xm−1}.
Definition 1. (Hatfield et al., 2019) A choice rule Cs of an institution s ∈ S is observable
substitutable if there does not exist an observable offer process (x1, ...xM) for s such that
xt /∈ Cs({x1, ..., xt, ...xM−1} but xt ∈ Cs({x1,...,xt,...,xM}).
In other words, if (x1, ..., xm) is an observable offer process, choice rule Cs satisfies ob-
servable substitutability if in an economy where s is the only institution no contract that is
rejected at step m− 1 of the cumulative offer process is accepted at step m. This condition
weakens the usual substitutability condition by requiring the set of rejected contracts to
expand only at sets of contracts that can be observed in the cumulative offer process.
Proposition 3 of Hatfield et al. (2019) indicates that if the choice function of every insti-
tution is observably substitutable, then for every preference profile P and any two orderings
` and `′ , C`(P ) = C`′ (P ). This implies that all cumulative offer mechanisms are equiva-
lent, i.e., the cumulative offer process is equivalent to the deferred acceptance mechanism
described by Gale and Shapley (1962).
Another important observation of Hatfield et al. (2019) is that if choice rule of every
institution is observably substitutable and mechanismM is stable and strategy-proof, then
8Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) call size monotonicity the law of aggregate demand.
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for any preference profile P ,M is equivalent to the cumulative offer mechanism. This implies
that if the choice rules of all institutions satisfy observable substitutability, and we want to
prove that a strategy-proof mechanism exists, it is enough to focus on the cumulative offer
process, as it is the only candidate. The authors also find that if the choice function of each
institution is observably substitutable, then for any preference profile P , the cumulative offer
process is stable.
Another desirable property of the cumulative offer mechanism is strategy-proofness for
agents. Without it, it is a complicated mechanism for participating agents. Even if the
mechanism is stable with respect to the reported preferences, it may no longer be stable
for the true preferences. However, observable substitutability is not enough to guarantee
strategy-proofness—for this, two other properties, which are defined below, are required.
Definition 2. (Hatfield et al., 2019) A choice rule Cs of an institution s ∈ S satisfies
observable size monotonicity if there does not exist an offer process (x1, ..., xM) for s such
that
| Cb({x1, ..., xM}) |<| Cb({x1, ..., xM−1}) | .
In other words, observable size monotonicity requires that the size of the accepted set of
contracts weakly increases along observable offer processes. This condition weakens the usual
size monotonicity condition in that it only has to be satisfied by observable offer processes.
Definition 3. (Hatfield et al., 2019) A choice rule Cs of an institution s ∈ S is non-
manipulable via contractual terms if there does not exist an ordering ` and preference profile
P for agents I, under which only contracts with s are acceptable, with some agent i ∈ I,
with a preference relation P˜i, for which only contracts with s are acceptable, such that
C`(P˜i, P−i)PiC`(Pi, P−i).
In other words, a choice rule Cs satisfies the non-manipulability via contractual terms
condition if no agent i ∈ I can profit from reporting a non-truthful preference relation that
only finds contracts with s acceptable.
Cumulative Offer Algorithm
The cumulative offer algorithm, which is the generalization of the agent-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962), is the central allocation mechanism used
in the matching with contracts framework. We now introduce the cumulative offer process
for matching with contracts. Here, we provide an intuitive description of this algorithm; we
give a more technical statement in Appendix B.
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In the cumulative offer process, agents propose contracts to institutions in a sequence
of steps l = 1, 2, ... :
Step 1: Some agent i1 ∈ I proposes his most-preferred contract, x1 ∈ Xi1 . Institution
s(x1) holds x1 if x1 ∈ Cs(x1)({x1}) and rejects x1 otherwise. Set A2s(x1) = {x1}, and set
A2
s′ = ∅ for each s
′ 6= s(x1); these are the sets of contracts available to institutions at the
beginning of Step 2.
Step 2: Some agent i2 ∈ I, for whom no contract is currently held by any institution,
proposes his most-preferred contract that has not yet been rejected, x2 ∈ Xi2 . Institution
s(x2) holds the contract in Cs(x2)(A2s(x2)∪{x2}) and rejects all other contracts in A2s(x2)∪{x2};
institutions s′ 6= s(x2) continue to hold all contracts they held at the end of Step 1. Set
A3s(x2) = A
2
s(x2) ∪ {x2} and set A3s′ = A2s′ for each s
′ 6= s(x2).
Step l: Some agent il ∈ I, for whom no contract is currently held by any institution,
proposes his most-preferred contract that has not yet been rejected, xl ∈ Xil . Institution
s(xl) holds the contract in Cs(xl)(Al
s(xl)
∪{xl}) and rejects all other contracts in Al
s(xl)
∪{xl};
institutions s′ 6= s(xl) continue to hold all contracts they held at the end of Step l− 1 . Set
Al+1
s(xl)
= Al
s(xl)
∪ {xl} and set Al+1
s′ = A
l
s′ for each s
′ 6= s(xl).
If at any time no agent is able to propose a new contract—that is, if all agents for
whom no contracts are on hold have proposed all contracts they find acceptable—then the
algorithm terminates. The outcome of the cumulative offer process is the set of contracts
held by institutions at the end of the last step before termination.
In the cumulative offer process, agents propose contracts sequentially. Institutions accu-
mulate offers, choosing a set of contracts at each step (according to Cs) to hold from the set
of all previous offers. The process terminates when no agent wishes to propose a contract.
4 Matching with Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules
We now introduce a model of institutional choice in which each institution has a set of
divisions and dynamic capacities for those divisions that vary as a function of the number
of unused slots in the preceding divisions. We model an institution s as having a set of
divisions Ks = {1, ..., Ks}. Each division k ∈ Ks has an associated sub-choice rule Csk :
2X × Z≥0 −→ 2Xs that specifies the contracts division k chooses given a set of offers and a
dynamic capacity to fill them. We require that each division k never chooses more contracts
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than its dynamic capacity, i.e., for a set of contracts Y ⊆ Xs and a dynamic capacity of κ,
we must have | Csk(Y ;κ) |≤ κ.
The choice procedure is lexicographic. Institution s starts filling positions in division 1.
It then fills positions in division 2, and so on and so forth. We let qs1 be the given capacity
of division 1. Given a set of contracts Y ≡ Y 1 ⊆ X and its given capacity qs1, Cs1(Y 1; qs1)
denotes the set of chosen contracts by division 1. We let r1 = qs1− | Cs1(Y ; qs1) | be the
number of remaining slots in division 1. The dynamic capacity of division 2 is then defined
as qs2 = qs2(r1). We remove every agent’s contract that was chosen by division 1 for the rest of
the procedure. Given the set of remaining contracts Y 2 and its dynamic capacity qs2, division
2 chooses Cs2(Y 1; qs2(r1)). We let r2 = qs2(r1)− | Cs2(Y 2; qs2) | be the number of vacant slots
from division 2. In general, given the number of vacant slots r1, r2, ..., rk−1, the dynamic
capacity of division k is given by qsk(r1, ..., rk−1). Given the set remaining contracts Y k
and its dynamic capacity qsk(r1, ..., rk−1), division k chooses Csk(Y k; qsk(r1, ..., rk−1)). We let
rk = q
s
k(r1, ..., rk−1)− | Csk(Y k; qsk(r1, ..., rk−1)) | be the number of vacant slots from division
k. All the remaining contracts of agents whose contracts chosen by division k is removed
from Y k for the rest of the procedure.9
Given an initial capacity of the first division q1s, a capacity transfer scheme of insti-
tution s is a sequence of capacity functions qs = (qs1, (qsk)
Ks
k=2), where q
s
k : Z
k−1
+ −→ Z+ for all
k ∈ Ks and such that qs1 + qs2(0) + qs3(0, 0) + · · ·+ qsK(0, ..., 0) = qs.
We also impose a mild condition on capacity transfer functions, à la Westkamp (2013). A
capacity transfer scheme qs is monotonic if, for all j ∈ {2, ..., Ks} and all pairs of sequences
(rl, r˜l), such that r˜l ≥ rl for all l ≤ j − 1,
qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1) ≥ qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), and
j∑
m=2
[qms (r˜1, ..., r˜m−1)− qms (r1, ..., rm−1)] ≤
j−1∑
m=1
[r˜m − rm].
Monotonicity of capacity transfer schemes requires that (1) whenever weakly more seats
are left unfilled in every division preceding the jth division, weakly more slots should be
available for the jth division, and (2) an institution cannot decrease total capacity in response
to increased demand in some divisions.
The tuple
(
I,S, P, (Csk(·, ·), qs)s∈S,k∈Ks
)
denotes a problem. Note that the collection of
sub-choice rules together with a capacity transfer function fully identify the overall choice
rule and are hence regarded as the primitives of the model.
9The formal description of the generalized lexicographic choice rules is given in Appendix A.
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Conditions on Divisions’ Sub-Choice Rules
We impose three conditions on divisions’ sub-choice rules: Substitutability (S), size mono-
tonicity (SM), and quota monotonicity (QM).
We already defined substitutability and size monotonicity in Section 3. We now introduce
quota monotonicity.
Definition 4. A sub-choice function Csk(·; ·) satisfies quota monotonicity if for any q, q′ ∈ Z+
such that q < q′ , for all Y ⊆ X
Csk(Y, q) ⊆ Csk(Y, q
′
), and
| Csk(Y, q
′
) | − | Csk(Y, q) |≤ q
′ − q.
QM requires choice rules to satisfy two conditions. First, given any set of contracts, if
there is an increase in the capacity, we require the choice rule to select every contract it was
choosing before increasing its capacity. It might choose some additional contracts. Second, if
the capacity of a division increases by κ, then the difference between the number of contracts
chosen with the increased capacity and the initial capacity cannot exceed κ.
Our first result relates the three conditions imposed on the sub-choice rules to the IRC
that is satisfied by the overall choice rule in the GLCR family.
Proposition 1. Suppose that every division’s sub-choice rule satisfies S, SM, and QM. Then,
the institution’s overall choice rule satisfies the IRC condition.
Note that Proposition 1 does not refer to the monotonicity of the capacity transfer func-
tions. That is, Proposition 1 holds even when the capacity transfer functions fail the mono-
tonicity property. In the proof of Proposition 1, it can be seen that sub-choice rules that
satisfy the IRC condition are sufficient for the overall choice rule to satisfy the IRC under
any given capacity transfer function. Notice that the substitutability and size monotonicity
of a choice rule imply the IRC condition (Aygün and Sönmez, 2013).
Our next result, Proposition 2, relates three conditions imposed on the sub-choice rules
together with monotonicity of the capacity transfer functions to the observable substitutabil-
ity of the overall choice rule.
Proposition 2. Suppose that every division’s sub-choice rule satisfies S, SM, and QM. If the
capacity transfer scheme is monotonic, then the institution’s overall choice rule is observably
substitutable.
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From the results of Hatfield et al. (2019) we know that the COM is stable when the choice
rule of every institution satisfies the observable substitutability. Another desirable property
of allocation mechanisms is strategy-proofness for agents. However, observable substitutabil-
ity is not sufficient to guarantee strategy-proofness of the cumulative offer mechanism. For
this, we need to show that choice rules in the GLCR family satisfy observable size mono-
tonicity and non-manipulation via contractual terms.
Proposition 3. Suppose that every division’s sub-choice rule satisfies S, SM, and QM. If the
capacity transfer scheme is monotonic, then the institution’s overall choice rule is observably
size monotonic.
Our last result in this section relates conditions imposed on sub-choice rules together with
the monotonicity of the capacity transfer functions to the non-manipulation via contractual
terms condition of overall choice rules.
Proposition 4. Suppose that every division’s sub-choice rule satisfies S, SM, and QM. If
the capacity transfer scheme is monotonic, then the institution’s overall choice rule is not
manipulable via contractual terms.
We are now ready to present our first main result.
Theorem 1. Suppose that every division’s sub-choice rule satisfies S, SM, and QM at each
institution. If the capacity transfer scheme of each institution is monotonic, then the COM
is stable and strategy-proof.
Theorem 1 is useful for practical real-life applications, as it states that a stable and
strategy-proof matching mechanism is possible under the GLCR family of institutional
choice. The design of different mechanisms for matching problems in India in Aygün and
Turhan (2019b), both for college admissions and job matching in the government sector via
vertical and horizontal reservations, utilizes Theorem 1.
5 Respect for Improvements
Respect for improvement is an attractive property of matching mechanisms. In some settings,
especially in meritocratic systems, it is rather crucial. The property is first defined by
Balinski and Sönmez (1999) in a priority-based setting. The authors showed that deferred
acceptance respects improvements in the sense that making one student more highly ranked
in schools’ priority rankings improves their deferred acceptance outcome. In the matching
with contracts setting, Sönmez and Switzer (2013), Sönmez (2013), and Kominers and
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Sönmez (2016) introduce choice rule specific improvement notions in the presence of ranking
lists. In our setting, we may not have ranking lists. As opposed to these papers, we define
a notion of improvement over choice rules regardless of the presence of a ranking list. This
choice-based improvement notion was first introduced by Afacan (2017) for overall choice
rules.
Definition 5. A sub-choice rule of division k at institution s C˜sk(·; ·) is an improvement
over Csk(·; ·) for agent i if, for any set of contracts X ⊆ X and for any integer κ ∈ Z+, the
following hold:
1. if x ∈ Csk(X;κ) such that i(x) = i, then y ∈ C˜sk(X;κ) for some y ∈ X such that
i(y) = i;
2. if i /∈ i[Csk(X;κ) ∪ C˜sk(X;κ)], then Csk(X;κ) = C˜sk(X;κ).
The first condition states that if a contract of agent i is chosen from a given set under the
sub-choice rule Csk, then a contract of the same agent (not necessarily the same one) must
be chosen under C˜sk given that division k has the same capacity under both sub-choice rules.
It is important to note here that it is not a problem if agent i prefers x over y. As the
cumulative offer algorithm is run, agents make offers in decreasing order of their preferences.
If agent i offers y at some point, it means that x was rejected in earlier steps. Hatfield et
al. (2019) show that renegotiation does not take place during a cumulative offer process if
institutions’ choice rules satisfy observable substitutability. We assume that sub-choice rules
satisfy S, SM, and QM. We also assume that capacity transfer functions are monotonic.
Thus, by our Proposition 2, institutional overall choice rules are observably substitutable.
The second condition states that if no contract of agent i is chosen from a given set under
both Csk and C˜sk, then the chosen sets are the same, given that division k has the same
capacity under choice rules Csk and C˜sk.
This improvement notion in conjunction with QM imply the following: If x ∈ Csk(X;κ)
such that i(x) = i, then y ∈ C˜sk(X;κ′) for some y ∈ X, such that i(y) = i for any κ′ ≥ κ.
Note that QM requires that when the capacity increases, the choice rule selects a superset
of the set it was selecting beforehand.
Consider two overall choice rules C˜s and Cs for institution s. Each rule takes the same
monotonic capacity transfer function qs as input and both of their sub-choice rules satisfy
properties S, SM, and QM. We say that an overall choice rule C˜s is an improvement over Cs
for agent i if C˜sk(·; ·) is an improvement over Csk(·; ·) for agent i at each division k = 1, ..., Ks.
Finally, we say that C˜ ≡ (C˜s)s∈S is an improvement over C ≡ (Cs)s∈S for agent i if C˜s is
an improvement over Cs for agent i at each institution s ∈ S.
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Definition 6. Mechanism ϕ respects improvements if for any problem (P,C) and C˜ such
that C˜ = (C˜sk(·; ·), qs)s∈S,k∈Ks is an improvement over C = (Csk(·; ·), qs)s∈S,k∈Ks for agent i
where sub-choice rules (C˜sk(·; ·))Ksk=1 and (Csk(·; ·))Ksk=1 satisfy S, SM, and QM at each institution
s ∈ S and capacity transfer schemes (qs)s∈S are all monotonic,
ϕ(P, C˜)Riϕ(P,C).
We are now ready to present our second main result.
Theorem 2. Suppose that at each institution divisions’ sub-choice rules satisfy S, SM, and
QM and capacity transfer function is monotonic. Then, the COM respects improvements.
Theorem 2 has significant implications in real-world applications where a meritocratic
system is integrated with affirmative action constraints, such as the matching problems in
India with vertical and horizontal reservations. Aygün and Turhan (2019b) design choice
rules for divisions for matching problems in India with these constraints by taking meri-
tocratic component into account. The meritocratic sub-choice rule that takes horizontal
reservations into account we propose is not q-responsive. Yet, we show that it satisfies S,
SM, and QM. Moreover, the capacity transfer functions in India—for transferring otherwise
vacant OBC slots to others—is shown to be monotonic in our setting. Hence, the COM
respects improvements in regards to our design.
An important implication of respecting improvements in the case of Indian college admis-
sions and job matching problems is that it incentivizes applicants to declare all horizontal
reservation types they have.
6 Conclusion
This paper introduces a new and practical family of choice rules motivated by real-life insti-
tutional allocation and choice problems. Institutions are divided into divisions where each
division is endowed with a choice rule that satisfies S,SM, and QM. Interaction between
divisions, in the sense of capacity transfers, are allowed. The capacity transfer functions are
assumed to be monotonic. The overall choice rule of an institution is then defined as the
union of its divisions’ sub-choices. The paper proves that each such choice rule satisfies the
three novel conditions introduced by Hatfield et al. (2019), namely, observable substitutabil-
ity, observable size monotonicity and non-manipulation via contractual terms, together with
the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition of Aygün and Sönmez (2013). As a result, in
many-to-one matching frameworks, the COM, with respect to such overall choice rules, be-
comes stable and strategy-proof. We define a choice-based notion of improvement and show
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that the COM respects improvements. This result has important implications for real-world
applications.
Our results can be used to design practical marketplaces. One such example is shown in
our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2019b), in the context of matching problems in
India that implement comprehensive affirmative action constraints, i.e., vertical and horizon-
tal affirmative action constraints. In our companion paper, we define a sub-choice rule that
satisfies S, SM, and QM. The sub-choice rule we designed considers additional policy goals
that are specific to India. The design also includes monotonic capacity transfer functions,
so that the COM appears as the unique stable and strategy-proof matching mechanism.
Our construction can be used not only for college admissions under constraints in India but
also in job matching processes for government-sponsored job recruitments. The COM also
respects improvements which has significant implications for the Indian case. We believe
the theory we developed in this paper will find other attractive real-life applications beyond
India.
7 Appendix
A. Formal Description of the Generalized Lexicographic Choice Pro-
cedure
Given a set contracts Y ≡ Y 1 ⊆ X , a capacity qs for institution s, and a capacity qs1 for
division 1, we compute the chosen set Cs(Y ; qs) in K steps where division 1 chooses in step
1, division 2 chooses in step 2, and so on and so forth.
Step 1 Given Y 1 and qs1, division 1 chooses Cs1(Y 1; qs1). Let r1 = qs1− | Cs1(Y 1; qs1) | . Let
Y 2 ≡ Y 1 \ {x ∈ Y 1 | i(x) ∈ i[Cs1(Y 1; qs1)]}.
Step k (2 ≤ k ≤ K): Given the set of remaining contracts Y k and its dynamic capac-
ity qsk(r1, ..., rk−1), division k chooses Csk(Y k; qsk(r1, ..., rk−1)). Let rk = qsk(r1, ..., rk−1)− |
Csk(Y
k; qsk(r1, ..., rk−1)) |. Let Y k+1 ≡ Y k \ {x ∈ Y k | i(x) ∈ i[Csk(Y k; qsk(r1, ..., rk−1))]}.
The union of divisions’ choices is the institution’s chosen set, i.e.,
Cs(Y ; qs) ≡ Cs1(Y 1; qs1)∪
K∪
k=2
Csk(Y
k; qsk(r1, ..., rk−1)).
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B. Formal Description of the Cumulative Offer Process
The cumulative offer process associated with proposal order Γ is the following algo-
rithm
1. Let l = 0. For each s ∈ S, let D0s ≡ ∅, and A1s ≡ ∅.
2. For each l = 1, 2, ...
Let i be the Γl−maximal agent i ∈ I, such that i /∈ i( ∪
s∈S
Dl−1s ) andmax
P i
(X\( ∪
s∈S
Als))i 6=
∅i— that is, the first agent in the proposal order who wants to propose a new contract—
if such an agent exists. (If no such agent exists, then proceed to Step 3, below.)
(a) Let x = max
P i
(X \ ( ∪
s∈S
Als))i be i’s most preferred contract that has not been pro-
posed.
(b) Let s = s(x). Set Dls = Cs(Als ∪ {x}) and set Al+1s = Als ∪ {x}. For each s′ 6= s,
set Dl
s′ = D
l−1
s′ and A
l+1
s′ = A
l
s′ .
3. Return the outcome
Y ≡ ( ∪
s∈S
Dl−1s ) = ( ∪
s∈S
Cs(Als)),
which consists of contracts held by institutions at the point when no agents want to
propose additional contract.
Here, the sets Dl−1s and Als denote the set of contracts held by and available to institution
s at the beginning of the cumulative offer process step l. We say that a contract z is rejected
during the cumulative offer process if z ∈ Als(z) but z /∈ Dl−1s(z) for some l.
C. Proofs
Before we prove the results, we first introduce some notation:
• If XM = {x1, ..., xM} is an observable offer process, we say Xm = {x1, .., xm}, i.e., Xm
are the contracts proposed up to step m of the observable offer process XM .
• Hk(Xm) denotes the set of contracts available to division k in the computation of
Cs(Xm).
• Fk(Xm) = ∪
n≤m
Hk(X
n), i.e., Fk(Xm) is the set of all contracts that were available to
division k at some point of offer process Xm = {x1, ..., xm}.
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• qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1) is the dynamic capacity of division k at step m− 1 of the observable
offer process and qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) is the dynamic capacity of division k at step m of the
observable offer process.
• Rk(Xm; qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) is the set of contracts rejected by division k at step m of the
observable offer process Xm.
We first prove the following lemma which will be key for proving our results.
Lemma 1. For all divisions k ∈ {1, ..., Ks} and for all m ∈ {1, ...,M} where M is the last
step of observable offer process XM = {x1, ..., xM}:
1. Ck(Hk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Hk(Xm).
2. Ck(Fk(Xm); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊆ Ck(Hk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1))∪[H(Xm)\Hk(Xm−1)].
3. Ck(Hk(Xm); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) = Ck(Fk(Xm); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)).
4. qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1) ≥ qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1).
5. Rk(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(Xm); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)).
Proof of Lemma 1 We use mathematical induction on pairs (m, k) ordered in the fol-
lowing way:
(1, 1), (1, 2), ..., (1, K), (2, 1), (2, 2), ..., (2, K), ..., (M, 1), (M, 2), ..., (M,K).
Initial Step: Consider m = 1 and any division k = 1, ..., K. Note that Xm−1 =
X0 = ∅ and X1 = {x1}. Since Hk(X0) = Hk(∅) = ∅, condition (1) holds trivially because
∅ ⊆ Hk(X1) for all k = 1, ..., K. Condition (2) also holds because it reduces to Ck(Fk(X1) ⊆
Hk(X
1) = Fk(X
1). Condition (3) also holds trivially since Hk(X1) = Fk(X1). Condition (4)
holds at the pair (1, 1) as for the first division the initial capacity is given exogenously, i.e.,
qs1. Condition (5) reduces to Rk(∅) = ∅ ⊆ Rk(Fk(X1)) and it trivially holds.
Inductive assumption: Assume that conditions (1)-(5) hold for
• every (m′ , k) with m′ < m and k = 1, ..., K,
• every (m, k′) with k′ < k.
We need to show that conditions (1)-(5) hold for the pair (m, k). We start with condition
(1).
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(1) Take z ∈ Ck(Hk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)). If z is chosen by division k, then it
must have been rejected by all divisions that precede it. Hence, we have
({x1, ..., xm−1})i(z) ⊆ ∩k′<kRk′ (Hk′ (Xm−1)).
By inductive assumptions (2) and (3), for all k′ < k, we have
Ck′ (Hk′ (X
m); qm
k′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1)) ⊆ Ck′ (Hk′ (Xm−1); qm−1k′ (r1, ..., rk)) ∪ [Hk′ (Xm) \Hk′ (Xm−1)].
Note that all the contracts of agent i(z) are in Hk′ (Xm−1) for all k
′
< k. Hence, i(z) /∈
i[Hk′ (X
m) \ Hk′ (Xm−1)]. We also know that i(z) /∈ i[Ck′ (Hk′ (Xm−1); qm−1k′ (r1, ..., rk))] be-
cause z is chosen by division k in the offer process Xm−1. Then we have
z /∈ Ck′ (Hk′ (Xm); qmk′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1)), ∀k
′
< k.
This means z is not chosen by any division that precedes division k, i.e., ({x1, ..., xm−1})i(z) ⊆
∩k′<kRk′ (Hk′ (Xm)). Therefore, we have z ∈ Hk(Xm).
(4) By the inductive assumption (4) holds for (i) every (m′ , k) with m′ < m and k =
1, ..., K, and (ii) every (m, k′) with k′ < k. To show that qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1) ≥ qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1),
we will first compare rm−1
k′ and r˜
m
k′ . By definition,
rm−1
k′ = q
m−1
k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)− | Ck′ (Hk′ (Xm−1); qm−1k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)) | .
By inductive assumption, we have qm−1
k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1) ≥ qmk′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1). We combine it
with the inequality above and get
rm−1
k′ ≥ qmk′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1)− | Ck′ (Hk′ (Xm−1); qm−1k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)) | .
By the inductive assumption (3), for all k′ < k, we have
Ck′ (Hk′ (X
m−1); qm−1
k′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1)) = Ck′ (Fk′ (X
m−1); qm−1
k′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1)).
By the size monotonicity of the sub-choice functions and the fact that Fk′ (Xm−1) ⊆
Fk′ (X
m), we have
| Ck′ (Fk′ (Xm−1); qm−1k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)) |≤| Ck′ (Fk′ (Xm); qm−1k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)) | .
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Hence,
rm−1
k′ ≥ qmk′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1)− | Ck′ (Fk′ (Xm−1); qm−1k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)) | .
By QM, we have
| Ck′ (Fk′ (Xm); qm−1k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)) | − | Ck′ (Fk′ (Xm); qmk′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1)) |≤
qm−1
k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)− qmk′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1).
Rearranging the terms gives us
qm−1
k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)− | Ck′ (Fk′ (Xm); qm−1k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)) |≥
qm
k′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1)− | Ck′ (Fk′ (Xm); qmk′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1)) |= r˜mk′ .
Combining the last inequality with rm−1
k′ ≥ qmk′ (r˜1, ..., r˜k′−1)− | Ck′ (Fk′ (Xm−1); qm−1k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)) |
gives us that rm−1
k′ ≥ r˜mk′ for all k
′
= 1, ..., k − 1. Hence, by the monotonicity of the capacity
transfers we conclude that qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1) ≥ qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1).
(5) By (4), we already know that qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1) ≥ qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1). By QM, we have
Ck(Fk(X
m−1); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊆ Ck(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
Hence, we have that
Fk(X
m−1) \ Ck(Fk(Xm−1); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊇
Fk(X
m−1) \ Ck(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) = Rk(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
Then, by substitutability of the sub-choice rules and the fact that Fk(Xm−1) ⊆ Fk(Xm),
Rk(Fk(X
m); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) = Fk(X
m) \ Ck(Fk(Xm); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊇
Fk(X
m−1) \ Ck(Fk(Xm−1); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)).
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Hence, we conclude that
Rk(Fk(X
m−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(Xm); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)).
(2) By the definition of choice rules, we have Ck(Fk(Xm); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊆ Fk(Xm).
We can decompose Fk(Xm) as follows:
Fk(X
m) = (Fk(X
m)) \ Fk(Xm−1)) ∪ [Rk(Fk(Xm−1)) ∪ Ck(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1))],
since Fk(Xm−1) = Rk(Fk(Xm−1)) ∪ Ck(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) by definition. If we
replace Rk(Fk(Xm−1)) by Rk(Fk(Xm)) and use the fact that Rk(Fk(Xm−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(Xm))
by (5), then we have
Ck(Fk(X
m); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊆ (Fk(Xm))\Fk(Xm−1))∪[Rk(Fk(Xm))∪Ck(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1))].
But, by definition, Ck(Fk(Xm); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) ∩ Rk(Fk(Xm)) = ∅. Hence, the above
inclusion relation can be written as
Ck(Fk(X
m); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊆ (Fk(Xm)) \ Fk(Xm−1)) ∪ Ck(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
By the definition of Fk(Xm) and Fk(Xm−1), we know that
Fk(X
m) \ Fk(Xm−1) ≡ Hk(Xm) \ ∪n<mHk(Xn) ⊆ Hk(Xm) \Hk(Xm−1).
Then, we can conclude that
Ck(Fk(X
m); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊆ (Hk(Xm)) \Hk(Xm−1)) ∪ Ck(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
Finally, by the inductive assumption (3), we have
Ck(Hk(X
m−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) = Ck(Fk(X
m−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
Hence, we can conclude that
Ck(Fk(X
m); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊆ (Hk(Xm)) \Hk(Xm−1)) ∪ Ck(Hk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
(3) By (2) we have that
Ck(Fk(X
m); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊆ (Hk(Xm)) \Hk(Xm−1)) ∪ Ck(Hk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
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By (1) we have Ck(Hk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Hk(Xm). Then, combining (1) and
(2) gives us
Ck(Fk(X
m); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) ⊆ Hk(Xm).
Hence, since the sub-choice rules satisfy the IRC, we can conclude that
Ck(Hk(X
m); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) = Ck(Fk(X
m); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)).
Proof of Proposition 1 Take a set of contracts Y ⊆ X and a contract z ∈ X \ Y , such
that z /∈ Cs(Y ∪{z}; qs). We need to prove that Cs(Y ; qs) = Cs(Y ∪{z}; qs). Before starting
our proof, note that the substitutability and size monotonicity of divisions’ sub-choice rules
imply they satisfy the IRC.
Consider two different choice processes for institution s: one starts with Y and one starts
with Y ∪ {z}. Let Y j and Y˜ j denote the set of contracts division j receives under choice
processes starting with Y and Y ∪ {z}, respectively. Note that Y 1 ≡ Y and Y˜ 1 ≡ Y ∪ {z}.
Let rj and r˜j denote the number of vacant seats at division k in the choice processes starting
with Y and Y ∪ {z}, respectively.
Consider division 1. Under both choice processes, the given capacity of division 1 is the
same, i.e., qs1. Since z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}; qs) we know that z /∈ Cs1(Y ∪ {z}; qs1). Since the
sub-choice rule of division 1 satisfies the IRC, we have that Cs1(Y ∪{z}; qs1) = Cs1(Y ; qs1). We
also have that r1 = r˜1 since
| Cs1(Y ∪ {z}; qs1) |=| Cs1(Y ; qs1) | .
Inductive assumption: Suppose that for all divisions j = 1, ..., k − 1 we have that
Csj (Y
j; qsj (r1, ..., rj−1)) = C
s
j (Y˜
j; qsj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)).
We will now prove that for division k we have that
Csk(Y
k; qsk(r1, ..., rk−1)) = C
s
k(Y˜
k; qsk(r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)).
The inductive assumption implies that for all j = 1, ..., k − 1 we have rj = r˜j. Hence, we
have that
qsk(r1, ..., rk−1) = q
s
k(r˜1, ..., r˜k−1).
Since z /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}; qs), we have that
z /∈ Csk(Y˜ k; qsk(r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)).
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Note that the inductive assumption also implies that Y˜ k ≡ Y k ∪ {z}. By the IRC property
of the sub-choice rules, we have that
Csk(Y
k; qsk(r1, ..., rk−1)) = C
s
k(Y˜
k; qsk(r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)).
Hence, we have Cs(Y ; qs) = Cs(Y ∪ {z}; qs).
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider an institution s ∈ S and observable offer process
X ≡ {x1, ..., xM} for s. Let XM−1 be the offer process {x1, ..., xM−1}. Suppose that y ∈
Rs(XM−1). Since y is rejected by institution s when s faces the offer process XM−1, it must
be rejected by all divisions k = 1, ..., K. Let rk and r˜k denote the number of unfilled seats
of division k for the choice processes starting with XM−1 and XM , respectively. Hence, for
all k = 1, ..., K, we have that
y ∈ Rsk(Hk(XM−1); qM−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
Since the sub-choice rules of divisions satisfy substitutability, we have that
y ∈ Rsk(Fk(XM−1); qM−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
for all k = 1, ..., K. By (5) of Lemma 1, we have that
Rk(Fk(X
M−1); qM−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(XM); qMk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1))
for each division k = 1, ..., K. This implies that
y ∈ Rsk(Fk(XM); qMk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1))
for each division k = 1, ..., K. Therefore,
y /∈ Csk(Fk(XM); qMk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)).
By (3) of Lemma 1, we have that
Csk(Hk(X
M); qMk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)) = C
s
k(Fk(X
M); qmk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)).
Hence, we have that
y /∈ Csk(Hk(XM); qMk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1))
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for all k = 1, ..., K. Thus, under the choice procedure that defines Cs, we have that
y /∈ Rs(XM), as desired.
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider an institution s ∈ S and observable offer processes
XM−1 ≡ {x1, ..., xM−1} and XM ≡ {x1, ..., xM} for s. Let rk and r˜k be the number of
unfilled slots of division k under choice procedures starting with the observable offer processes
XM−1 and XM , respectively. Let Hk(XM−1) and Hk(XM) denote the sets of contracts
division k faces under the choice procedures starting with XM−1 and XM , respectively.
Let Fk(XM−1) = ∪
n≤M−1
Hk(X
n) and Fk(XM) = ∪
n≤M
Hk(X
n), i.e., Fk(XM−1) and Fk(XM)
are the set of all contracts available to division k at some point of offer process XM−1 =
{x1, ..., xM−1} and XM = {x1, ..., xM}, respectively. For the ease of notation, we let rj =
(r1, ..., rj−1) and r˜j = (r˜1, ..., rj−1) . Similarly, let rk = (r1, ..., rk−1) and r˜k = (r˜1, ..., rk−1).
Note that by (3) of Lemma 1 we can replace H sets with F sets as follows:
Csj (Hj(X
M−1); qM−1j (rj) = C
s
j (F1(X
M−1); qM−1j (rj))
and
Csj (Hj(X
M); qMj (r˜j)) = C
s
j (Fj(X
M); qMj (r˜j)).
By (4) of Lemma 1, we know that
qM−1k (rk) ≥ qMk (r˜k).
By the second condition of monotonic capacity transfer functions, we have
k∑
j=1
(qM−1j (rj)− qMj (r˜j)) ≤
k−1∑
j=1
[rj − r˜j].
Replacing
rj = q
M−1
j (rj)− | Csj (Fj(XM−1); qM−1j (rj)) |
and
r˜j = q
M
j (r˜j)− | Csj (Fj(XM); qMj (r˜j)) |
gives us the following:
k∑
j=1
[qM−1j (rj)− qMj (r˜j)] ≤
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k−1∑
j=1
[qM−1j (rj)− | Csj (Fj(XM−1); qM−1j (rj)) | −qMj (r˜j)+ | Csj (Fj(XM); qMj (r˜j)) |].
Readjusting the terms on the right and left sides gives us
0 ≤ qM−1k (rj)− qMk (r˜j) ≤
k−1∑
j=1
[Csj (Fk(X
M); qMk (r˜j))− Csj (Fj(XM−1); qM−1j (rj))].
By QM of sub-choice rules, we have the following:
| Csk(Fk(XM−1); qM−1k (rk)) | − | Csk(Fk(XM−1); qMk (r˜k)) |≤ qM−1k (rj)− qMk (r˜k)
≤
k−1∑
j=1
[Csj (Fk(X
M); qMk (r˜j)− Csj (Fj(XM−1); qM−1j (rj))].
By SM of the sub-choice rules, we also have the following:
| Csk(Fk(XM−1); qM−1k (rj)) |≤| Csk(Fk(XM); qM−1k (rj)) |
since, by definition, Fk(XM−1) ⊆ Fk(XM). Combining the inequalities above, we obtain
| Csk(Fk(XM−1); qM−1k (rk)) | − | Csk(Fk(XM); qMk (r˜k) |≤ qM−1k (rj)− qMk (r˜j)
≤
k−1∑
j=1
[Csj (Fj(X
M); qMj (r˜j))− Csj (Fj(XM−1); qM−1j (rj))].
Hence, we have
k∑
j=1
| Csj (Fj(XM−1); qM−1j (rj)) |≤
k∑
j=1
| Csj (Fj(XM); qMj (r˜j)) | .
Applying (3) of Lemma 1 again gives us
k∑
j=1
| Csj (Hj(XM−1); qM−1j (rj)) |≤
k∑
j=1
| Csj (Hj(XM); qMj (r˜j)) | .
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Since the inequality above holds for all k = 1, ..., K, we have
K∑
j=1
| Csj (Hj(XM−1); qM−1j (rj) |≤
K∑
j=1
| Csj (Hj(XM); qMj (r˜j)) |,
which is the desired conclusion.
Proposition 2 of Hatfield et al. (2019)
Suppose that Cs is a choice rule for institution s ∈ S that is observably substitutable and
manipulable by agent i ∈ I via contractual terms. In this case, there exists a preference
profile P and preferences P˜i under which only contracts with s are acceptable, with Pi of
the form
Pi : z
1Pi · · ·PizM ,
and P˜i of the form
P˜i : z
0P˜iz
1P˜i · · · P˜izM ,
such that either
1. Ci(Pi, P−i) = ∅ while Ci(P˜i, P−i)Pi∅, or
2. Ci(P˜i, P−i) = ∅ while Ci(Pi, P−i)P˜i∅.
Before starting to prove Proposition 4 we will first prove a lemma and then introduce some
extra notation to ease our proof.
Lemma 2. Let Xm = {x1, ..., xm} and Y n = {y1, ..., yn} be two observable offer processes,
such that Xm ⊆ Y n. Then, for all divisions k = 1, ..., K,
1. Fk(Xm) ⊆ Fk(Y n), and
2. Rk(Fk(Xm); qmk (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(Y n); qnk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)), and
3. qmk (r1, ..., rk−1) ≥ qnk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), where (r1, ..., rk) and (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) are the vector of
the number of vacant seats in choice procedures starting with offer sets Xm and Y n,
respectively.
Proof of Lemma 2 We proceed by mathematical induction on divisions k = 1, ..., K.
For the first division, i.e., k = 1, F1(Xm) ≡ Xm and F1(Y n) ≡ Y n by definition. Hence,
we have by our assumption F1(Xm) ⊆ F1(Y n). Thus, (1) is satisfied. Since the capacity
of the first division is given, regardless of the offer set, statement (3) is trivially satisfied.
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The substitutability of the sub-choice rules implies that R1(F1(Xm); qs1) ⊆ R1(F1(Y n); qs1).
Therefore, (2) is also satisfied for k = 1.
Inductive assumption: Suppose that (1)-(3) are satisfied for all divisions j < k.
We now need to show that (1)-(3) hold for division k.
We start by showing that (3) holds for k. By our inductive assumption (3) and QM, for
all j < k,
| Csj (Fj(Xm); qmj (r1, ..., rj−1)) | − | Csj (Fj(Xm); qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)) |≤ qmj (r1, ..., rj−1)−qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1).
Rearranging the terms gives us
qmj (r1, ..., rj−1)− | Csj (Fj(Xm); qmj (r1, ..., rj−1)) |≥ qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)− | Csj (Fj(Xm); qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)) | .
By our inductive assumption (1) and the size monotonicity, we have
qmj (r1, ..., rj−1)− | Csj (Fj(Xm); qmj (r1, ..., rj−1)) |≥ qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)− | Csj (Fj(Y n); qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)) |,
which implies that rj ≥ r˜j for all j < k. Then, by monotonicity of capacity transfer functions,
qmk (r1, ..., rk−1) ≥ qnk (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1).
Hence, (3) holds for division k.
To show (1), consider z ∈ Fk(Xm). There are two cases to consider:
1. i(z) /∈ i[Cj(Fj(Xm); qmj (r1, ..., rj−1))], for all j < k.
In this case, we know that all contracts of agent i(z) are rejected by all divisions that
precede division k, i.e.,
(Xm)i(z) ⊆ ∩j<kRj(Fj(Xm); qmj (r1, ..., rj−1)).
By our inductive assumption (2), we have
(Xm)i(z) ⊆ Rj(Fj(Y n); qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)),
for some j < k. Then, all contracts of agent i(z) in Xm are considered by some division
at some n′ ≤ n in the choice procedure starting with Y n. Hence, we have that (Xm)i(z) ⊆
Fk(Y
n). Since z ∈ Fk(Xm) was chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that Fk(Xm) ⊆ Fk(Y n).
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2. i(z) ∈ i[Cj(Fj(Xm); qmj (r1, ..., rj−1))] for some j < k.
Let y be the contract of agent i(z) that is chosen by some division j that precedes division
k in the choice procedure starting with Xm, i.e.,
y = [Cj(Fj(X
m); qmj (r1, ..., rj−1))]i(z).
Since Xm is an observable offer process and the overall choice rule of institution s, Cs(·; qs),
is observably substitutable, we have
(Xm)i(z) \ {y} ⊆ Fk(Xm).
However, y /∈ Fk(Xm). Otherwise, we would contradict with the fact that y is chosen by
some division j < k in the choice procedure starting with Xm. Recall that as n increases,
the sets Fj(Xn) expand and the overall choice rules are observably substitutable.
Now, if i(z) /∈ i[Cj(Fj(Y n); qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1))] for all j < k, then it means (Xm)i(z) ⊆ Fk(Y n)
and the proof concludes. Otherwise, suppose that there exists some w ∈ Cj(Fj(Y n); qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1))
for some j < k and i(w) = i(z). Then, since Y n is an observable offer process and Cs satisfies
observable substitutability, we have that (Y n)i(z) \ {w} ⊆ Fk(Y n).
• If w /∈ (Xm)i(z), then (Xm)i(z) ⊆ (Y n)i(z) \ {w} ⊆ Fk(Y n) and the proof concludes.
• If w = y, then (Xm)i(z) \ {y} ⊆ (Y n)i(z) \ {w} ⊆ Fk(Y n) and the proof concludes.
• If w ∈ (Xm)i(z) \ {y}, then, by the fact that Xm is an observable offer process, there
must exist m′ < m such that w ∈ Rj(Fj(Xm
′
); qm
′
j (r1, ..., rj−1). By the construction
of the F sets, the sub-choice rules that satisfy QM and (4) of Lemma 1, we have w ∈
Rj(Fj(X
m); qmj (r1, ..., rj−1)). By (1) and (3) of Lemma 1 and the fact that sub-choice
rules satisfy substitutability, we have w ∈ Rj(Fj(Y n); qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)). It contradicts
w ∈ Cj(Fj(Y n); qnj (r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)). Hence, w ∈ (Xm)i(z) \ {y} cannot be the case.
Some Extra Notation for the proof of Proposition 4
Consider an arbitrary agent i, and let z0, z1, ..., zL be an arbitrary sequence of contracts in
Xi. Fix a profile of preferences P−i for all other agents, and let Pi and P˜i be given by
Pi : z
1Pi · · ·PizL,
P˜i : z
0P˜iz
1P˜i · · · P˜izL.
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We first fix an ordering ` over the set of contracts X . We let XN = {x1, ..., xN} be the
observable offer process induced by the COM with ordering ` under the preferences (Pi, P−i)
when institution s is the only institution available. Suppose also that X̂ = {x̂1, ..., x̂N̂} is the
observable offer process induced by the COM with ordering ` under the preferences (P˜i, P−i)
when institution s is the only institution available.
Lemma 3. If z0 /∈ Cs(X̂N̂ ; qs), then Rs(XN ; qs) ⊆ Rs(X̂N̂ ; qs) and for all divisions k =
1, ..., K we have that Fk(XN) ⊆ Fk(X̂N̂).
Proof of Lemma 3 We proceed by mathematical induction on pairs (m, k) in the following
order:
(1, 1), (1, 2), ..., (1, K), (2, 1), (2, 2), ..., (2, K), ..., (N, 1), (N, 2), ..., (N,K),
and at each step we show the following:
Fk(X
m) ⊆ Fk(X̂N̂)
Rk(Fk(X
m); qmk (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(X̂N̂); qN̂k (rˆ1, ..., rˆk−1)),
where qmk (r1, ..., rk−1) and qN̂k (rˆ1, ..., rˆk−1) are the dynamic capacity of division k in the choice
processes starting with Xm and X̂N̂ , respectively.
For the base case (1, 1), it must be that x1 is either the highest-ranked contract of some
agent i(x1) 6= i or x1 = z1. In the former case, x1 must be offered at some step of the offer
process X̂N̂ , as it is the best contract agent i(x1) want to offer. In the latter case, since z0 is
rejected by our assumption, i must offer her second-best contract under P˜i, z1 = x1, at some
step in the offer process X̂N̂ . Hence, in both cases, x1 ∈ X̂N̂ . Since F1(X̂N̂) = X̂N̂ , we have
that F1({x1}) ⊆ F1(X̂N̂). Then, by substitutability of the sub-choice rules, we have that
R1(F1(X
1); qs1) ⊆ R1(F1(X̂N̂); qs1).
We now show that both inclusion relations hold for (m, k) if they both hold for
• every pair (m′ , k), such that m′ < m and k = 1, ..., K, and
• every pair (m, k′) with k′ < k.
We first show that they hold for (m, 1), given that they are satisfied for every pair (m′ , k),
such that m′ < m and k = 1, ..., K. By the inductive assumption for pairs (m − 1, k), we
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have
Rk(Fk(X
m−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(X̂N̂); qN̂k (rˆ1, ..., rˆk−1))
for all k = 1, ..., K. By the observability of Xm we have
({x1, ..., xm−1})i(xm) ⊆ Rk(Hk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1))
for all k = 1, ..., K. Moreover, by the substitutability of the sub-choice rules, we have
({x1, ..., xm−1})i(xm) ⊆ Rk(Hk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
Hence, we have
Rk(Hk(X
m−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)).
Therefore, given that Rk(Fk(Xm−1); qm−1k (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(X̂N̂); qN̂k (rˆ1, ..., rˆk−1)) for
all k = 1, ..., K, we find
({x1, ..., xm−1})i(xm) ⊆ Rk(Fk(X̂N̂); qN̂k (rˆ1, ..., rˆk−1)),
for all k = 1, ..., K.
By (3) of Lemma 1, there exists an N ′ ≤ N̂ such that
({x1, ..., xm−1})i(xm) ⊆ Rk(Fk(X̂N
′
); qN
′
k (rˆ1, ..., rˆk−1)),
for all k = 1, ..., K. By the observability of the offer process X̂N̂ and the fact that it
represents all the offers made under the cumulative offer process for (P˜i, P−i), there must
exist some step n˜ at which xm is proposed in X̂N̂ . Recall that X̂N̂ ≡ F1(X̂N̂). Therefore, we
have that xm ∈ X̂N̂ ≡ F1(X̂N̂). Also, by the inductive assumption for the pair (m−1, 1), we
have that Xm−1 ≡ F1(Xm−1) ⊆ F1(X̂N̂). Moreover, since we know that F1(Xm) ≡ Xm =
{xm} ∪Xm−1, we have
F1(X
m) ⊆ F1(X̂N̂),
which is the first condition we want to show for the pair (m, 1). Then, by substitutability of
the sub-choice rules, we can conclude that
R1(F1(X
m); qs1) ⊆ R1(F1(X̂N̂ ; qs1),
which ends our proof for the pair (m, 1).
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We now show that they hold for the pair (m, k) when k > 1, given that they hold for
every pair (m′ , k) such that m′ < m and k = 1, ..., K, and every pair (m, k′) with k′ < k. We
will first show that Fk(Xm) ⊆ Fk(X̂N̂). By our inductive assumption on the pair (m− 1, k),
it is sufficient to show that Hk(Xm) ⊆ Fk(X̂N̂), since Fk(Xm) ≡ Fk(Xm−1)∪Hk(Xm). Take
z ∈ Hk(Xm). Since z ∈ Hk(Xm), all contracts of agent i(z) must have been rejected by all
divisions that preceded division k, i.e.,
z ∈ ∩k′<kRk′ (Hk′ (Xm); qmk′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)).
By the substitutability of the sub-choice functions, we can replace Hk′ (Xm) sets by Fk′ (Xm)
sets for all k′ < k, i.e.,
z ∈ ∩k′<kRk′ (Fk′ (Xm); qmk′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)).
By our inductive assumption on pairs (m, k′) with k′ < k, we have
Rk′ (Fk′ (X
m); qm
k′ (r1, ..., rk′−1)) ⊆ Rk′ (Fk′ (X̂N̂); qN̂k′ (rˆ1, ..., rˆk′−1)).
Thus, we have that z ∈ ∩k′<kRk′ (Fk′ (X̂N̂); qN̂k′ (rˆ1, ..., rˆk′−1)).
By (3) of Lemma 1, we have that
Cs
k′ (Hk′ (X̂
N̂); qN̂
k′ (rˆ1, ..., rˆk′−1)) = C
s
k′ (Fk′ (X̂
N̂); qN̂
k′ (rˆ1, ..., rˆk′−1)),
for all k′ < k. Therefore, if there were a k′ < k, such that z ∈ Cs
k′ (Hk′ (X̂
N̂); qN̂
k
′ (rˆ1, ..., rˆk′−1)),
that would imply z ∈ Cs
k′ (Fk′ (X̂
N̂); qN̂
k′ (rˆ1, ..., rˆk′−1)), which contradicts
z ∈ ∩k′<kRk′ (Fk′ (X̂N̂); qN̂k′ (rˆ1, ..., rˆk′−1)).
Then, the following must hold:
z ∈ ∩k′<kRk′ (Hk′ (X̂N̂); qN̂k′ (rˆ1, ..., rˆk′−1)).
Therefore, there must exist some step n¯ of the offer process X̂N̂ such that z ∈ Hk(X̂ n¯), and
hence z ∈ Fk(X̂ n¯) ⊆ Fk(X̂N̂). So, we can conclude that Fk(Xm) ⊆ Fk(X̂N̂), which is the
first condition we wanted to show for the pair (m, k). To show the second condition, we
apply Lemma 2 which then gives us
Rk(Fk(X
m); qmk (r1, ..., rk−1)) ⊆ Rk(Fk(X̂N̂); qN̂k (rˆ1, ..., rˆk−1)).
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This completes our induction and ends the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4 By Proposition 2 of Hatfield et al. (2019), it is sufficient to show
that when s is the only institution, the following two conditions hold:
1. If i[C(Pi, P−i)] = ∅, then either i[C(P˜i, P−i)] = ∅ or i[C(P˜i, P−i)] = {z0}, and
2. If i[C(P˜i, P−i)] = ∅, then i[C(Pi, P−i)] = ∅.
To show (1), note that Lemma 3 implies that if i[C(Pi, P−i)] = ∅ and z0 /∈ C(P˜i, P−i), then
Rs(X
N) ⊆ Rs(X̂N̂). Moreover, if i[C(Pi, P−i)] = ∅, then {z1, ..., zL} ⊆ Rs(XN) and hence
{z1, ..., zL} ⊆ Rs(X̂N̂). Thus, i[C(P˜i, P−i)] = ∅.
To show (2), first notice that by Proposition 1 of Hatfield et al. (2019) the COM is order
independent, since our overall choice rules are observably substitutable and observably size
monotonic. Hence, we can consider XN and X̂N̂ to be generated by the cumulative offer
process with respect to the same proposal ordering ` in which all of the agents’ contracts
other than i precede all of the contracts associated with i. Under this choice of `, there
must exist an λ such that
1. xm = xˆm for all m < λ,
2. xλ = z1, and
3. xˆλ = z0.
That is, λ is the first step of each cumulative offer process with respect to the order ` at
which agent i proposes. The offer process X̂N̂ ends with the rejection of the contract zL,
since zL follows all contracts with agents other than i according to our specific ordering
` and the fact that i[C(P˜i, P−i)] = ∅. At each step after λ, exactly one contract is newly
rejected, since the overall choice rule of the institution is observable substitutable and size
monotonic. Formally, the following holds:
1. | Rs(X̂m˜) \Rs(X̂m˜−1) |= 1 for all m˜ = λ, λ+ 1, ..., N̂ , and
2. zL ∈ Rs(X̂N̂) \Rs(X̂N̂−1).
For the offer process XN , we must have | Rs(Xm) \ Rs(Xm−1) |= 1 for all m = λ, λ +
1, ..., N − 1.
Notice that Xλ−1 = X̂λ−1. Hence, we have | Cs(Xλ−1; qs) |=| Cs(X̂λ−1; qs) |. Moreover,
since | Rs(X̂m˜) \Rs(X̂m˜−1) |= 1 for all m˜ = λ, λ+ 1, ..., N̂ we must have that
| Cs(Xλ−1; qs) |=| Cs(X̂N̂ ; qs) | .
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Similarly, since | Rs(Xm) \Rs(Xm−1) |= 1 for all m = λ, λ+ 1, ..., N − 1, we have
| Cs(XN−1; qs) |=| Cs(X̂N̂ ; qs) | .
But, since XN ⊆ X̂N̂ , the observable size monotonicity of Cs implies that
| Cs(XN ; qs) |≤| Cs(X̂N̂ ; qs) | .
Therefore, we must have
Rs(XN ; qs) \Rs(XN−1; qs) 6= ∅.
Toward a contradiction, suppose that y ∈ Rs(XN ; qs) \ Rs(XN−1; qs) 6= ∅ and y 6= zL.
Note that y is the least-preferred acceptable contract of agent i(y) with respect to Pi(y)
where i(y) 6= i. Then, Lemma 3 implies that there is some step m∗ ≥ λ, such that y ∈
Rs(X̂m
∗
) \ Rs(X̂m∗−1). But, since | Rs(X̂m∗) \ Rs(X̂m∗−1) |= 1 and y is the least preferred
acceptable contract for i(y), the cumulative offer process for (P˜i, P−i) would end at step
m∗ with the rejection of y. This contradicts the fact that the cumulative offer process for
(P˜i, P−i) ends with the rejection of zL.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Propositions (1)-(4), the overall choice rule of each institution
satisfies the IRC condition, observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and
non-manipulation via contractual terms. Then, by Theorem 4 (Hatfield et al., 2019), the
COM is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let Φ denote the COM. The contract agent i receives for the
problem (P,C) is denoted by Φi(P,C). Consider a problem (P,C) and C˜, which is an
improvement over C for agent i such that each sub-choice rule satisfies S, SM, and QM
under both C and C˜. Moreover, each institution’s capacity transfer function is monotonic
under both C˜ and C. Let x and y be the contracts agent i receives under the cumulative
offer processes with regards to C and C˜, respectively. That is,
Φi(P,C) = x and Φi(P, C˜) = y.
Toward a contradiction, assume that xPiy. Note that yRi∅ (with the possibility that y = ∅)
because the cumulative offer algorithm returns an individually rational match for agents.
Consider the false preference, P˜i, for agent i such that x is the only contract agent i. That
is,
P˜i : x− ∅.
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We will first show that Φi(P˜i, P−i, C˜) = x. We prove this claim in two steps. In the
first step, we will show that Φi(P˜i, P−i, C) = x. Toward a contradiction, suppose that
Φi(P˜i, P−i, C) = ∅. Recall that Φi(P,C) = x. Hence, agent i can report Pi instead of P˜i and
and obtain x. That means the COM is manipulable at the preference profile (P˜i, P−i). How-
ever, we established in Theorem 1 that the COM is strategy-proof. This is a contradiction.
Therefore, Φi(P˜i, P−i, C) = x must hold.
In the second step, we will show that Φi(P˜i, P−i, C˜) = x. In the first step, we showed that
Φi(P˜i, P−i, C) = x. Recall that C˜ is an improvement over C for agent i. Let s(x) = s. We
know that the cumulative offer process is order independent. Let agent i be the last agent to
propose contracts. Then, by the definition of improvements, the cumulative offer processes
under choice profiles C˜ and C are identical without agent i. Since C˜s is an improvement
over Cs for agent i, the division in institution s(x) that selects x at (P˜i, P−i, C) selects x at
(P˜i, P−i, C˜), as well. Hence, we have Φi(P˜i, P−i, C˜) = x.
Therefore, agent i has an incentive to report P˜i at problem (P, C˜). This contradicts the
fact that the COM is strategy-proof under our assumptions. Thus, we must have yRix.
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